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Abstract
An important determinant of health system performance is contracting. Providers often respond to financial 
incentives, despite the ethical underpinnings of medicine, and payers can craft contracts to influence 
performance. Yet contracting is highly imperfect in both single-payer and multi-payer health systems. Arguably, 
in a competitive, multi-payer environment, contractual innovation may occur more rapidly than in a single-payer 
system. This innovation in contract design could enhance performance. However, contractual innovation often 
fails to improve performance as payer incentives are misaligned with public policy objectives. Numerous countries 
seek to improve healthcare contracts, but thus far no health system has demonstrably crafted the necessary blend 
of incentives to stimulate optimal contracting.
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Introduction
Health systems can be conceptualised as a mesh of interlinked, 
interdependent markets. There are distinct markets for 
primary care services, hospital care, medical devices, 
pharmaceuticals, labour markets for healthcare human 
resources and positions, and markets for medical and nursing 
education. Each market involves supply and demand. Given 
this diverse array of market forces, Professor Goddard duly 
notes that the real issue is not whether competition should 
(or should not) exist in healthcare, but rather to identify the 
particular circumstances and forms in which competition can 
exert beneficial effects.
In a competitive market, the relationship between sellers 
and buyers typically takes the form of a contract. Healthcare 
contracts seek to specify the characteristics of service 
provision and the level of reimbursement. The contract is 
an instrument through which market participants seek to 
determine performance and value. A number of conditions 
are necessary for the stipulation and enforcement of contracts. 
These include the specification of anticipated performance or 
“deliverables,” the identification of clear loci of responsibility, 
and the availability of penalties such as non-payment or non-
renewal of the contracting relationship.1 Professor Goddard’s 
editorial considers many key elements of competition,2 but we 
believe that comment is warranted on the interaction between 
competitive markets and contracting practice. 
As Professor Goddard notes, competition is not a binary 
phenomenon. In each developed country, governments play 
some role in healthcare financing and provision, while even in 
state provision countries (eg, National Health Service [NHS] 
in the United Kingdom) payment per patient exists and some 
competition is present. All systems must address problems 
relating to equity and performance, while a fundamental 
problem is development of improved instruments to observe 
quality and value. The design of contracts (either by the state 
or by competing insurers) is of fundamental importance in 
addressing these problems. 
Innovation in Contracts
This paper shall consider contracts in the market for health 
services, in which a private insurer or public purchaser 
writes contracts with provider organisations or clinicians. 
The underlying principles apply to primary care and 
hospital services. Provider organisations often serve as an 
intermediary between purchasers and clinicians, when 
purchasers negotiate contracts at the organisational level and 
managers seek to improve performance of clinicians through 
contracts and other organisational change instruments. The 
three archetypal forms of contract for healthcare services 
are fee for service, capitation, and global budget, and various 
combinations of these have been implemented to offset 
associated perverse incentives.3 
Empirical evidence consistently illustrates the impact of 
contracts on performance. Numerous studies illustrate that 
activity-based payment can increase throughput,4 while 
paying clinicians by salary tends to reduce the number of 
treated patients. The bulk of health spending relates to service 
provision, and contracts that encourage provision of care in 
a prudent manner may temper cost escalation. Furthermore, 
contracts that reward high quality care may, in principle, save 
lives and improve patients’ quality of life.5 
Innovation in contracts is evident in many health systems. 
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In the English NHS, a monopsonistic purchaser system, 
authorities negotiated the Quality and Outcomes Framework 
with primary care providers in an effort to enhance clinical 
quality and value. In the United States, a major public 
policy objective is development of contracts that discourage 
unnecessary care, while rewarding high quality care and 
value. In the marketplace of Massachusetts, USA, the Blue 
Cross Blue Shield health insurance company sculpted the 
Alternative Quality Contract, a forerunner of “accountable 
care” contract mechanisms that are becoming more prevalent 
across the United States.6 
In the Netherlands during 2010, the government approved 
the concept of bundled-payment on a national basis for the 
care of certain chronic conditions including diabetes. Services 
are specified according to recommendations in national 
clinical guidelines. Insurers contract with a care group that 
is responsible for managing care, in many cases involving 
sub-contracting of services to clinicians such as dietitians and 
ophthalmologists. In the case of diabetes, early evaluation 
suggests this bundled payment contract may have improved 
adherence to key care processes and boosted performance 
transparency, but this raises anti-trust concerns and may 
impinge on patients’ freedom of choice, while researchers 
have found no effects on spending.7
As noted, health systems can be viewed as a mesh of 
interdependent markets. The structure and conduct of the 
insurance market has ramifications for the contracts written 
with providers. Arguably, innovative contract forms may 
evolve more rapidly in a pluralistic payer environment such 
as the Dutch or US systems. By contrast, in a centralised, 
single-payer system, the emergence of new contract designs 
may be less dynamic. In a single payer environment in which 
all providers are treated the same, a change for one provider 
impacts all providers. In a competitive payer environment 
individual contracting may be the norm, leading to variation 
in contract design. In turn, this may lead to learning about the 
optimal attributes of contracts, and ultimately to evolution 
and improvement[1].1
According to proponents of competition, better performance 
may emerge from pressure on purchasers to develop 
innovative contract mechanisms. But competition can 
damage performance when purchasers lack incentives to 
encourage value in service provision. The insurance market 
must be astutely regulated, to transmit the right incentives to 
the provider sector. Accordingly, contractual evolution might 
not improve system performance. In multi-payer systems 
where the effectiveness of risk equalisation is limited, such as 
in Ireland and Israel, insurers may flourish by risk-selecting 
profitable patient subpopulations, as noted by Professor 
Goddard, and this dilutes incentives to craft improved 
contracts for providers.8 Risk adjustment is also increasingly 
used in provider-payer contracts to adjust payment to reflect 
patients’ risk profile. This is important when using capitation 
or global budget forms of contract, such as the Alternative 
Quality Contract.6
In a multi-payer system, beneficial waves of contractual 
innovation may be more likely when effective preconditions 
for competition between payers are in place, to compel payers 
to serve as prudent purchasers of care on behalf of enrolees. 
According to the “managed competition” framework, insurers 
can flourish by crafting effective contracts with care providers, 
in order to extract value from the provider market. If these 
preconditions are met, arguably innovation in contracts can 
occur more rapidly and effectively than in a single payer 
environment. Authorities in countries such as the Netherlands 
seek to transition to such an incentive framework, but to our 
knowledge, no country has demonstrably achieved such 
incentives.8
Standardisation of Contracts
Despite the potential benefits of contractual innovation, in 
many circumstances it is appropriate to temper the degree 
to which payers can innovate. In the United States, annual 
spending on healthcare administration is approximately 
$361 billion per year, twice the national spend on heart 
disease and three times the spend on cancer. Around 
half of this expenditure is considered unnecessary by the 
Institute of Medicine,  and this waste is partly due to lack of 
standardisation in contracting.
According to one study, US physicians spend an average 
of 43 minutes a day interacting with health plans about 
contractual issues such as the content of medical formularies 
and procedure authorisation. Moreover, physician offices must 
employ coders to process and monitor diverse reimbursement 
arrangements across different contracts. Provider credentialing 
systems are a part of many contracting systems, but these 
systems exhibit much redundancy as providers must furnish 
almost identical information to many organisations, and 
physicians and their staff typically spend a total of 23 hours 
working on credentialing related tasks annually.
It may be possible to significantly reduce administrative 
costs through standardisation. The potential benefits 
of standardisation have been demonstrated in multiple 
industries. In the retail sector, Walmart forced suppliers 
to adhere to its computer standards in order to process 
transactions, and this led to widescale standardisation of 
retail information systems.
Contract standardisation constrains the number of 
dimensions on which payers can innovate, and may 
temper the number of ways in which insurers compete. 
In the United States, a coordinated, national credentialing 
system may save almost $1 billion annually for providers. 
Furthermore, providers could save up to $2 billion annually 
from standardisation of electronic transmission of contract 
billing information and other administrative data. In a 
pluralistic payer environment, government agencies may be 
the only purchaser with sufficient power and scale to compel 
standardisation of contracts.9 
The decision of whether to enforce standardisation for a 
contractual process or metric should be determined on 
a case by case basis. It may be appropriate to standardise 
basic administrative procedures (such as use of ICD-10, 
and recording of patient characteristics), but the freedom to 
redesign contracts in various ways may result in learning and 
evolution. To reach optimal contracting, this inherent tension 
between standardisation and innovation must be reconciled.
Other Considerations
An ideal contract in one setting may be inappropriate 
elsewhere, as contracts must be tailored for local 
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circumstances and needs. For example, the introduction of 
universal healthcare coverage in Massachusetts was facilitated 
by an established and forceful regulatory culture, and by 
comparatively little consumer demand for the high-cost 
sharing, low-benefit insurance products that are increasingly 
prominent elsewhere in the United States. In other states, it has 
been more difficult to implement contracts modelled on the 
Massachusetts system.10 Nonetheless, a subset of contractual 
innovations in a pluralistic environment such as the United 
States might be of use in other settings. For example, the 
application of the “diagnosis-related group” classification 
system was pioneered in the United States, and this has been 
adapted for use in many other settings.
The perverse incentives associated with multi-payer systems 
are well-documented, and a fragmented payer market dilutes 
the influence of each payer on provider behaviour.8 Moreover, 
contractual innovation is not confined to the private sector 
or to multiple payer systems. The Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation in the United States, for instance, is a 
public sector unit conducting trials in innovative contracting 
mechanisms.11
Of note, optimisation of contracts requires new tools to 
observe value, and to strengthen payers vis-à-vis providers. 
Research is underway into novel tools to measure 
performance, such as partly automated machine learning tools 
to assess quality of decision-making in medical encounters. 
A new generation of performance measurement tools may 
lead to major improvement in both competitive and single-
payer systems, although there may be important differences 
between systems in the rate of adoption of such innovations. 
Ultimately, learning and evolution in contracts is important 
for the advancement of healthcare systems. Further evidence 
is needed on whether single-payer or multi-payer systems can 
offer the optimal framework for this goal.
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Endnotes
[1] This conceptualisation implies that in a single-payer system with individual 
contracts for providers, the evolution of contracts may proceed at an intermediate 
pace relative to the principal two system typologies.
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